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In this paper we explore early musical behaviors through the lenses of the recently
emerged “4E” approach to mind, which sees cognitive processes as Embodied,
Embedded, Enacted, and Extended. In doing so, we draw from a range of
interdisciplinary research, engaging in critical and constructive discussions with both
new findings and existing positions. In particular, we refer to observational research
by French pedagogue and psychologist François Delalande, who examined infants’
first “sound discoveries” and individuated three different musical “conducts” inspired
by the “phases of the game” originally postulated by Piaget. Elaborating on such
ideas we introduce the notion of “teleomusicality,” which describes the goal-directed
behaviors infants adopt to explore and play with sounds. This is distinguished from
the developmentally earlier “protomusicality,” which is based on music-like utterances,
movements, and emotionally relevant interactions (e.g., with primary caregivers) that do
not entail a primary focus on sound itself. The development from protomusicality to
teleomusicality is discussed in terms of an “attentive shift” that occurs between 6 and
10 months of age. This forms the basis of a conceptual framework for early musical
development that emphasizes the emergence of exploratory, goal-directed (i.e., sound-
oriented), and self-organized musical actions in infancy. In line with this, we provide a
preliminary taxonomy of teleomusical processes discussing “Original Teleomusical Acts”
(OTAs) and “Constituted Teleomusical Acts” (CTAs). We argue that while OTAs can be
easily witnessed in infants’ exploratory behaviors, CTAs involve the mastery of more
specific and complex goal-directed chains of actions central to musical activity.
Keywords: music cognition, musical development, exploratory behaviors, music in infancy, embodied cognition,
embodied music cognition, 4E cognition
INTRODUCTION
Elysa is a healthy 6-month old human infant. Today her caregiver brings her a new toy, a
colorful rattle. He shows it to her and places it in front of her. This excites Elysa, as we
can infer from her body motions and facial expressions. As a consequence of this state of
excitement, she moves and reaches for it. But as soon as she touches the rattle, something
unexpected happens: it produces a sound. While Elysa initially appears to be surprised, she
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also seems to enjoy the experience and keeps moving the
rattle, making even more sounds. By engaging in such activities
(interacting with the toy, looking at it, and listening to its
sounds) over days and weeks, Elysa improves her ability to
make controlled and motivated engagements with the rattle. She
is learning bodily awareness and control and, in the process,
develops important understandings of how perceptual and
proprioceptive modalities (movement, touch, sight, and sound)
correspond with each other. Through this form of multisensory
exploration, where perception and action are continuously
coupled, Elysa will discover the causal relationships between her
actions and the auditory feedback coming from the toy.
The exploratory behaviors described above are commonly
observable in infants of this age (see Pierroutsakos andDeLoache,
2003; Sheya and Smith, 2010a,b; Soska et al., 2010). They reach
for, grasp, and manipulate objects in their environment as soon
as they develop adequate motor skills. In doing so, they also
encounter the sound properties of the objects at hand, which may
offer further opportunities for exploration and for developing
new types of actions1. Through such modes of discovery, infants
develop patterns or “repertoires” of actions that are—among
other things—specifically directed toward sound-making goals
(Clarke, 2005; Delalande, 2009). In this paper, we consider how
a closer examination of such exploratory activities may reveal
new ways of understanding musical experience in early infancy.
More specifically, we suggest that the ontogenetic emergence
of human musicality may be best understood by referring to
the unique, adaptive, self-organizing, and creative ways infants
explore and interact with the possibilities-for-action afforded
by their (sonic) environment (see Gibson and Walker, 1984).
Where more traditional views focus on describing how pre-given
genetic developmental “programs” respond to environmental
stimuli, our approach aims to provide a preliminary taxonomy
of the general kinds of music-related activities that emerge in
infancy through active processes of corporeal engagement with
the world. In doing so, we will make a general distinction between
protomusical behaviors, which include music-like utterances and
movements that do not entail a primary focus on sound itself
(e.g., emotional-affective interactions with the caregiver; see e.g.,
Dissanayake, 2000; Trevarthen and Malloch, 2000; Cross and
Morley, 2009), and teleomusical2 behaviors, which describe the
goal-directed actions infants adopt to interact with the sound-
properties of their environment. This distinction, we argue, will
help us capture a number of new features of early musicality
that may be relevant for future empirical and theoretical work
in the field of developmental music psychology, and music
1This echoes Piaget’s (1952) notion of circular reactions. This describes how—
after an initial postnatal phase characterized by innate reflex actions in response
to external stimulation—infants begin (between 1 and 4 months) to engage in
repetitive actions centerd on exploring their body (e.g., kicking their legs). As
Piaget observed, between 4 and 8 months such actions start to involve objects of
the environment (e.g., shaking a rattle). This so-called stage of “secondary circular
reaction” is then followed by a phase where infants become able to use their
motor knowledge to reach for goals. In brief, Piaget’s work highlights the tight
link between perceptual and motor activities in infant development, and how they
influence each other in a circular way as the infant explores the environment in
increasingly complex ways.
2The term “teleomusicality” was originally coined by Schiavio and Menin (2011).
cognition more generally. Additionally, we will also discuss
how this perspective may be further developed in association
with the so-called “4E” approach to mind—which conceives of
cognition as an Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, and Extended
phenomenon (see Rowlands, 2010). The juxtaposition of these
four dimensions may offer a useful framework for studying the
emergence and development of musical behaviors in terms of the
action-perception cycles that characterize cognition in infancy
and beyond (Thelen and Smith, 1994).
Before we start, we should note that similar insights have
already been addressed in music scholarship (e.g., Clarke, 2005;
Reybrouck, 2005, 2012; Leman, 2007; Leman et al., 2009; Krueger,
2013; Addessi, 2014, 2015; Leman and Maes, 2015; Schiavio and
Altenmüller, 2015; Schiavio and van der Schyff, 2016; Schiavio
et al., 2016). And indeed, the orientation we develop here has
antecedents in—and is inspired by—the work of Piaget (1952,
1964); Imberty (1995, 2009), and Delalande (1984, 1998, 2009,
2013) among others. It also aligns with more recent research
on action-perception coupling and mirror neurons in music
education (e.g., Addessi, 2012; Schiavio and Timmers, 2016);
embodied cognition and music education (e.g., Volpe et al.,
2012; Addessi et al., 2015; Nijs and Leman, 2016; van der Schyff
et al., 2016); infant-caregiver vocal interaction (e.g., Gratier,
2003, 2007; Nakata and Trehub, 2004; Gratier and Trevarthen,
2008); musical parenting and music education (e.g., Papoušek,
1996; Ilari et al., 2011); and the role of action experience for
musical development (e.g., Philips-Silver and Trainor, 2007;
Gerson et al., 2015b). Drawing on this body of work we aim
to (i) develop new bridges between disciplines such as music
education, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience,
theoretical biology, and philosophy of mind, (ii) extend previous
findings within such interdisciplinary scholarship, and (iii) offer
more nuanced ways of discussing how musicality develops in
infancy. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, a systematic
investigation aimed at exploring music in infancy through the
lenses of the 4E approach is still missing. Therefore, this paper
also aims to begin to fill this gap and to contribute to current
state-of-the-art in early music cognition research more generally.
THE MUTUALITY OF ACTION AND
PERCEPTION
In this section we would like to introduce an approach to musical
development not based in pre-given (or genetic) programs, but
rather in the deep continuity between action and perception.
In doing so, we will explore research in neuroscience and
developmental studies that reveals the centrality of situated,
agentic, goal-based action for the acquisition of skill and
understanding, and show how this work is relevant in musical
contexts. We begin by considering contributions involving
auditory perception and cognition in infancy, arguing that such
capacities should be understood in terms of the ways infants
actively explore andmake sense of the environments they inhabit.
In support of this, we then discuss work on the Mirror Neuron
System (MNS) that illuminates the action-perception cycles
inherent to understanding and engaging in goal-directed activity
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more generally. Here we make some preliminary suggestions for
what such insights might mean for musical development. These
musical concerns will be developed in more detail in the section
What is Teleomusicality? Before that, however, let us go back to
Elysa.
Sonic Experience in Action
Elysa’s world presents regularities and novelties that stimulate her
curiosity, affording a number of emerging activities that allow
(further) possibilities for exploration. And indeed, sonic events
represent some of the first and most important spontaneous
ways young infants engage with and make sense of the world
(see Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009; Countryman et al., 2016).
Unlike vision, the auditory system is already highly functional at
birth (Bredberg, 1968; see also Lecanuet et al., 1986, 1988, 1991,
for discussion on pre-natal sounds experiences), and infants
appear to display great acuity to sounds (see Trehub, 2009;
Perani et al., 2010; cf. Keefe et al., 1994). Evidence from scalp-
recorded auditory evoked potentials suggests that fetuses are
already sensitive to auditory events, although amniotic fluid and
maternal tissues may limit their experience (Smith et al., 2003).
According to Moore and Jeffery (1994), while hearing starts at
the 22nd week of gestation, both cochlea and central auditory
pathway are still immature (structurally and functionally). It
is suggested, then, that it is at 5–6 months (postnatal) of age
that frequency and temporal resolution can be understood to
havematured properly (e.g.,Werner, 2002). 5-month-old infants,
for example, are able to discriminate differences in frequency
of less than one half step (Olsho, 1984). And starting from
8 months of age they begin to make pitch discriminations based
on an awareness of melodic contour (Trehub et al., 1984).
Interestingly, infants are also found to be better than adults at
discriminating between certain typical aspects of Western music
(e.g., a pitch variation; see Trainor and Trehub, 1992). While
adults are easily able to detect changes that violate expectations
associated withWesternmusical structures (such as non-diatonic
variations), they have more difficulties with diatonic changes—
that is, with pitch alterations that do not deviate from the tonal
structure typical of Western classical music. Infants, on the other
hand, “detected both changes equally well” (Trainor and Trehub,
1992, p. 399). Similar results have also emerged in rhythm
perception studies, where it has been found that, when compared
to adults, infants display greater accuracy in detecting changes
in newly listened rhythmical patterns—seemingly independently
of any familiarity they may have with the rhythmical structures
typical of their own culture (Hannon and Trehub, 2005).
However, a preference for rhythmical structures common to
the infant’s own culture emerges later (Soley and Hannon,
2010). Other studies suggest that young infants also discriminate
between consonant and dissonant sounds, as well as sound
properties such as location, duration, and pitch (see also Trehub,
2003a,b,c,d,e).
This research reveals that infants have the ability to attend to
sounds andmusic in very nuanced ways (which appear to become
narrowed over time through factors such as enculturation). At a
very young age, Elysa is already able to capture many features
of the auditory events in her environment. Her sensitivity
to melodic, rhythmic, and harmonic3 structures is stunning.
However, as with other human infants, she is not just a
passive receiver of sonic inputs; her experiences with sounds
do not simply involve responses to given auditory stimuli.
Infants like Elysa, rather, may be observed to spontaneously
and deliberately generate music-like patterns, developing new
rhythmic or melodic structures (Imberty, 1995; Papoušek, 1996).
Often this occurs through vocal and rhythmic interactions with
the caregiver that involve bodily movement (Condon and Sander,
1974; Jaffe et al., 2001; Custodero and Johnson-Green, 2003,
2008; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009). However, the musical
world of an infant also includes more independent processes
of exploration and discovery that involve the development of
action understanding and prediction. With regard to this point
we should note here that although infants’ vocal productions
are important constituents of their musical development (see
Stern et al., 1975, 1982; Gratier, 2003; Addessi, 2008a,b; Eckerdal
and Merker, 2009), these also display a different phenomenology
from manual explorations. As we cannot provide here an
extensive overview of both, we will mainly focus on the
latter for the rest of the paper. Moreover, while some of the
communicative features attributed to vocal sounds are also
inherent to manual skills, many of the goals afforded by
sensorimotor explorations (e.g., playing with a ball, grasping
a toy, etc.) remain unachievable in terms of vocal production
(infants cannot vocally manipulate their environment directly—
although they can certainly vocally “ask” for something to be
done). This said, in the following section we develop possibilities
for understanding the development of sensorimotor knowledge
from a neural perspective. Here we consider the role two classes
of motor neurons play in developing repertoires of goal directed
activity that are relevant to an agent’s lived experience. This
will help to inform the discussion of musical development that
follows.
Mirroring and Understanding
A basic form of action understanding is observed in newborns
(see Craighero et al., 2011). At around 6 months of age
infants begin to employ controlled grasping and appropriate pre-
configurations of the fingers (von Hofsten, 1982). This develops
rapidly into more directed reaching and grasping behavior.
Interestingly, the development of these more sophisticated
behaviors appears to coincide with the emergence of the infant’s
ability to predict the goals of the actions of other people involved
in similar activities (i.e., reaching for objects; Woodward, 2009).
This helps reveal the bidirectional way action and perception
influence each other (Thelen, 1989, 1994; Thelen et al., 2001;
Gerson and Woodward, 2014a,b; Gerson et al., 2015a). As
Kanakogi and Itakura (2011) suggest, “the developmental onset
of infants’ ability to understand an action, reflected by the ability
to predict the goal of others’ action, is synchronized with the
developmental onset of their own ability to perform that action,
and [...] there is developmental correspondence relationship
between the ability to predict the goal of an action and the
ability to perform that same motor action” (see also Gergely
3This refers to two or more sounds played simultaneously.
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et al., 1995; van der Meer et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998; Daum
et al., 2011; Cannon et al., 2012, 2016; Robson and Kuhlmeier,
2016). With this in mind, we provide next a conceptual review
of the main findings concerning Mirror and Canonical neurons,
and consider how this research might align with and support
the action-oriented, and goal-based, approach to early musical
development outlined in the following sections.
Mirror Neurons are sensorimotor neurons that become active
both when performing a motor action and when observing
or hearing a similar action made by another individual (Di
Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Kohler et al., 2002).
They were first discovered in the ventral premotor cortex of
macaque monkeys, and were subsequently observed in the brains
of surgical patients (Mukamel et al., 2010). A common way
to assess mirror-like activity in the brain involves the use of
EEG. A number of studies with adults and infants (e.g., Cochin
et al., 1998, 1999; Nyström, 2008) have confirmed mirror-like
activity by reporting mu rhythm desynchronization during both
production and observation of actions. In terms of fMRI studies,
a meta-analysis conducted by Molenberghs et al. (2012) appears
to locate mirror-like activity in inferior frontal gyrus, ventral
premotor cortex, IPL, primary visual cortex, and cerebellum,
among other areas (see Keysers andGazzola, 2010). In addition to
these Mirror Neurons, another set of neurons, dubbed Canonical
Neurons, discharge when we observe a graspable object without
performing any movement, as well as when we grasp that object
(Rizzolatti et al., 1988). In a well-known study, Fadiga et al. (1995)
show that the motor evoked potential of the human motor cortex
increases during simple observation tasks, reflecting the muscle
activity relevant for the actual performance of the observed
motor behavior.
Put simply, Canonical Neurons discharge during the
execution of a motor act, and in response to the presentation
of an object in the observer’s peripersonal space. Typically, they
display congruence between the coded action (e.g., grasping) and
the physical properties of the observed object (e.g., a small ball)4.
Mirror Neurons, instead, fire both during the performance of
an object-directed action and when that same action is observed
in others. They are elicited not by the precise movements
performed but, rather, by the goal of the given action (Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2008). In other words, what really matters
for these neurons is not the kinematics (e.g., contractions of
single groups of muscles), but the goal-directedness involved
in grasping as such (see Fogassi et al., 2005; Keysers, 2007).
Mirror-like activations are elicited by those actions the observer
knows how to perform—those actions that are in his or her
“motor repertoire”5.
4Here readers may consider how canonical neurons provide supporting evidence
for the notion of “affordance”—a key aspect of Gibson’s ecological psychology
(see Gibson, 1979). This concept refers to the motor possibilities an object in the
environment offers to an individual in relation to its physical capabilities—this
can change through growth and experience (i.e., learning) (see Raos et al., 2006;
Maranesi et al., 2014).
5In Rizzolatti and Luppino’s words: “This motor vocabulary is constituted of
‘words,’ each of which is represented by a population of F5 neurons. Some words
code the general goal of an action (e.g. grasping, holding). Others code how, within
a general goal, a specific action must be executed. These words select specific
An elegant fMRI experiment carried by Buccino et al. (2004)
provides further clarification regarding this point. They asked
participants to watch two groups of silent videos wherein a
man, a monkey, and a dog perform (i) ingestive actions and
(ii) communicative actions. The actions in the first set of videos
involved biting food, and all three animals were engaged in
the same action. In the second set of videos, however, the
communicative motor behaviors were different—the observed
actions were relevant to each species, such as talking (humans),
lip smacking (monkeys), and barking (dogs). The results of
the experiment showed that for the first condition (biting)
there was a clear overlapping of the brain areas that became
active during the observation of the videos. Indeed, biting is
a relevant aspect of the motor activity of all three animals.
And thus, “watching the three videos produced the activation
of two sites (a rostral and a caudal) in the inferior parietal
lobule as well as the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus
and the adjacent precentral gyrus” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2008, p. 132). However, the results of the second condition
(communication) were significantly different. The mirror-like
activation was much weaker when the human participants
observed acts like monkey lip smacking, and disappeared when
they watched the dog barking.
Finally, a well-known study by Kohler et al. (2002) showed
that a subclass of F5 mirror neurons fire not only when a
monkey observes or performs a given action, but also when it
hears the sound produced by the action itself. A goal-directed
action, therefore, can be understood independently from the
format of the sensory information. The (sonic) motor acts
employed in this experiment involved breaking a peanut and
ripping apart a sheet of paper—these are acts that are relevant
for the monkey, and are thus present in their acquired motor
knowledge. As such, we could infer that when the monkey heard
only the sound of a known action, it automatically activated in
its brain the motor plan necessary to perform the very same
action (see also Damasio, 2003; Gallese, 2005; for work related
to music, readers may consider Bangert and Altenmüller, 2003;
D’Ausilio et al., 2006; D’Ausilio, 2007, 2009; Overy and Molnar-
Szakacs, 2009). Suchmulti-modal forms of action understanding,
therefore, are not wholly pre-given, but rather develop via
the animal’s history of embodied engagement with the socio-
material environment. As we will consider next, these insights
may help us better understand how as infants develop richer
motor repertoires, they also gain the ability to understand the
actions of others, as well as the capacity to enact new forms of
goal-directed behavior through exploratory forms of action-as-
perception.
From Action to Musical Experience
Human infants are active explorers of their physical and social
world (McCall, 1974; Ruff, 1984, 1986). From birth they develop
sets of multimodal skills, and engage in meaningful interactions
‘motor prototypes’ such as, for example, the configuration of fingers necessary for
the precision grip. Finally, other words specify the temporal aspects of the action to
be executed (e.g., opening of the hand). Thus, each action is represented by specific
populations of neurons at different degrees of abstraction” (Rizzolatti and Luppino,
2001, p. 891).
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with persons and objects in their environment, gaining relevant
experience and knowledge of its regularities and possibilities
for action. As we have begun to discuss, it is argued that
such interactions entail a form of bidirectional dependency,
where the young organisms’ developmental trajectories do not
simply rely on internal instructions “programmed” to respond
to environmental stimuli (see Bertenthal and Campos, 1987;
Gottlieb, 1991a,b). Rather, bio-cognitive development involves
active processes of organism-world interactivity. This echoes
Gibson’s (1979) famous assertion that “[w]e must perceive in
order to move, but we must also move in order to perceive”
(p. 223), pointing to the mutual influence of perception and
action (see also Merleau-Ponty, 1945).
The insight that motor and perceptual processes are
dynamically determined by each other has allowed scholars to
go beyond traditional approaches to the study of human action.
The latter were mostly interested in discovering the “motor
programs” of the central nervous system, and in understanding
how such programs might generate behavioral outcomes. In
contrast to this, we may consider the now-classic work by
Esther Thelen and her collaborators (see e.g., Thelen, 1989,
1994, 2000; Thelen and Smith, 1994; Thelen et al., 2001; Smith
and Thelen, 2003; see also Spencer et al., 2006), which offers
an impressive collection of contributions aimed at describing
motor development in terms of the “complex and ongoing
interplay of arousal, attention, motivation, biomechanics, neuro-
motor control, muscle performance, head-arm-trunk posture,
and experience” (Galloway, 2005, p. 105).
For example, one might think of the developmental transition
from one mode of exploratory action, such as crawling, to
another, such as walking (see Oudgenoeg-Paz et al., 2012; He
et al., 2015). Here we may return to Elysa: she is now 10 months
old and by now has been crawling for some time. However, she
has just developed enough coordination and physical strength to
begin to walk upright. This involves a “shift” in her behavior,
where the pattern of crawling—which was stable for months—
is now destabilized by the pattern of standing and walking. As
Smith and Thelen comment: “there is no ‘program’ for crawling
assembled in the genes or wired in the nervous system. It self-
organizes as a solution to a problem (move across the room),
later to be replaced by a more efficient solution. Development is
a series of evolving and dissolving patterns of varying dynamic
stability rather than an inevitable march towardmaturity” (Smith
and Thelen, 2003, p. 344). The following passage can further
clarify this idea:
A baby is provided by nature with some very helpful
equipment to start its long course of learning about and
interacting with the world. A baby is provided with an urge
to use its perceptual system to explore the world; and it is
impelled to direct attention outward toward events, objects
and their properties, and the layout of the environment
(Gibson, 1988, p. 7; quoted in Thelen and Smith, 1994, p. 314).
Infants seek out information for their senses; they actively
engage with the properties of the environment to assess and
make sense of the possibilities it offers. Our understanding
of music should thus take into consideration this biological
disposition that young infants display. With regard to this point,
we could perhaps try to propose a very general definition of
“music” in early infancy. We might conceive of music as an
emerging property of the ongoing relation between brain, body,
and environment; a property that can only emerge when infants
actively engage in motivated exploratory behaviors involving
sound-related outcomes. There can be “musical activities” when
those sound-properties are explored and engaged with in creative
ways—that is, when the goal of the exploration becomes the
sound per se6. Concerning this last point, Delalande (e.g., 2015)
draws on the phenomenological tradition proposed by Schaeffer
(1966; see also Chion, 1983, 1988; Nattiez, 1987) where the
precise distinction between sound, noise, and music is revealed
to be culturally influenced, and where focused explorations of
soundmay be better understood in terms of the complex acoustic
(e.g., timbral) affordances of the “objet sonore” that arise as the
infant engages with it. This last point resonates closely with
our perspective. And indeed, we suggest that our focus on goal
directedness and the development and re-enactment of specific
repertoires of actions might help to extend such insights. By
recognizing the deep continuity between culture and (motor)
cognition, we maintain, like Delalande, that “music” cannot be
reduced to an objective event, nor to a pre-given behavioral
program. As such, we advocate for a dynamic framework—
developed in continuity with interdisciplinary scholarship—that
sees the motor components of action, perception, and cognition,
as deeply fundamental for musicality to occur. As we will discuss
further, this may help to expand Delalande’s (2013) concept of the
“conduite d’écoute” (conduct of listening), where he argues that
music should not be first considered as an ensemble of stimuli
(sonic or graphic), but rather as a bundle of conducts (actions)
involved with making it and listening to it (p. 158). From this
perspective, musical experience depends on the agency of the
person who engages with it. It involves the adaptive capacities of
the listener/player to create and enact meaningful relationships
with the “objet sonore” (p. 164)—a process that involves the
integration of emotional-affective and motor aspects (p. 230;
see also Clarke, 2005, for similar points discussed within an
ecological framework).
Musical Goals
Consider again our 10 month-old Elysa. At this age she has
realized that sounds are dependent on the motor behaviors
employed to produce them. However, she will not simply use
the same chain of acts every time she explores the environment.
That would be boring. By engaging in new or enhanced patterns
of motor action, and by exploring different sounding objects,
Elysa is able to experience, adapt to, and develop the sounding
properties of her environment in richer ways and thus enact
a range of meaningful relationships between them. Indeed, the
6Our tentative definition of music is not meant to imply that intersubjective factors
do not play a role in the development of musical abilities in infants. There is
indeed a large body of work that shows how interactions between infants and
caregivers shape their perceptual and motor abilities (Custodero, 2005), beginning
in utero and immediately after birth (Parncutt, 2009). However, in this paper we
have chosen to focus mainly on self-motivated explorations, where little or no
intervention is needed. This makes musical goal-directedness simpler to identify.
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more she familiarizes herself with certain actions (e.g., squeezing,
shaking), the more she will be able to shift her attention toward
other things, such as the visual and sonic properties of the objects
she is engaging with. Delalande (2009) observes that when this
happens (i.e., when the infant’s attention is captured by the
produced sounds, rather than only by her own action) the infant
will start to play with sounds in a meaningful way. That is,
Elysa may begin to apply some basic rhythmic or even melodic
variations to her sound productions.
This kind of behavior seems to emerge properly between 6
and 10 months of age. Before 6 months of age, when objects that
constitute goals for given actions (e.g., something to be grasped)
appear in the infant’s visual field, they do not pay attention to the
physical properties of the object and instead concentrate on the
action itself. However, by 10months infants focus on both actions
and their goals—e.g., objects and their properties. This resonates
with a study by Ambrosini et al. (2013), who compared the
anticipatory gaze of 6, 8, and 10 month-old infants (and a control
group of adults) during goal-directed observational tasks. The
researchers found a significant correlation between the ability to
perform a given action and the capacity to successfully predict
the goal of an observed action. This was noted in particular when
6-month old infants observed actions involving the precision
grasping of objects (i.e., using thumb + index), which they are
still not able to perform. Here they tended to focus on the
action and not on what was grasped (they were not able to
predict the goal of the action). By contrast, full-hand grasping
is a well-established skill in the motor repertoire of most infants
of this age. And indeed, when observing these types of action
infants of this age did appear to predict with more precision
the appropriate goal of the given grasping action. A related
finding involves the relationship between age and the degree of
gaze proactivity. Here advantages for goal prediction were found
from 8 months onwards, with 10 month-old subjects showing
faster gaze proactivity to precision grasping. Taken together, these
results suggest that the ability to perceive and/or predict the goal
of observed motor behaviors is action-specific—it depends on
whether the infant is capable of actually carrying out the action
observed.
This point is fundamental for our proposal. Infants develop
repertoires of goal-directed actions that will allow them to
explore the environment in a meaningful (e.g., musical)
way. But, by mastering certain actions, infants also develop
adequate perceptual abilities that could motivate further ways
of interacting with the world. For example, by understanding
the goal of a given sound-related activity performed by another
individual (e.g., the caregiver, or a peer), infants could respond
in creative ways, playing with sounds in a condition of mutual
understanding (as long as both individuals have developed their
motor vocabulary of actions). Here, a number of possibilities
for empirical corroboration might be considered. For example,
one could test whether infants who have developed an adequate
repertoire of musically relevant actions are keener to play with
others in musical games, when compared to infants who have
less familiarity with musical actions. Or, we could investigate
mu rhythm desynchronization in infants (with EEG) during
the auditory perception of sounds produced by simple actions
between two groups (similarly to the previously proposed
possible study): infants who are familiar with repertoires of
actions directed toward sound-making, and infants who are
not. Given what we have considered thus far, it is predicted
that mu rhythm desynchronization will be observed only in the
first group, reflecting the activation of the mirror system (see
e.g., Woodward and Gerson, 2014; Gerson et al., 2015a; Fox
et al., 2016). Possible follow-ups might include the examination
of perceptual and emotional responses to musical stimuli, and
the presentation of musically affordative environments (i.e., toy
musical instruments), between the same two groups.
At this point, it is important to briefly address the key
notion of “musical goal.” This can be defined as the (more or
less predicted) outcome of a musically motivated action. That
is, the action involves engaging with sounds in a way that is
not focussed on other primary interests (e.g., seeking attention
from a caregiver etc.), but rather is chiefly concerned with the
manipulation of sound itself7. This allows us to distinguish
between (i) sound-related activities that are motivated by a
genuine intention to play with sounds and (ii) sound-related
activities that are focused on other goals. Good examples of (i)
involve an infant hitting (“drumming”) a surface and waiting
for a caregiver to do it too (preferably in different, novel, ways),
or manipulating a sound-making object to get a desired result.
Conversely, situations associated with (ii) could emerge when
infants use sound to seek for or get the attention of their caregiver
because they need nutrition, affection, or some other form care
or interaction. In what follows, we shall name the former activity
teleomusicality, and the latter protomusicality. Let us begin with
teleomusicality.
WHAT IS TELEOMUSICALITY?
Between 6 and 10 months of age, infants develop the ability
to integrate relevant information concerning action and objects
in increasingly sophisticated ways (Sommerville et al., 2005).
This can be understood in terms of a history of exploratory
interactivity with an environment, where cycles of action-as-
perception lead to even richer repertories of goal-directed acts. In
the course of such processes, objects emerge as rich informational
structures whose properties specify possibilities for action (i.e.,
affordances) in relation to the developing motor expertise of the
infant (Perone and Oakes, 2006; Perone et al., 2009). But what
happens when the goal of an action becomes a sound? That is,
what happens when the goals of one’s actions are not simply
directed toward reaching for and moving an object, but rather
are focused on the objects’ sound properties? And what strategies
might an infant employ to explore and manipulate the sonic
environment created through her interactions with a sounding
object?
7With regard to this point one could argue that some music-related actions do in
fact involve other goals that go beyond the sole production of sounds—like dancing
for example. However, we could say that an activity like dancing is usually enacted
in a musical context, showing that the goal of similar actions remains intrinsically
musical. As we will see, this is different from activities that we could define as
“musical” only a-posteriori, such as clapping hands for approval, for example. In
such cases, the motivation behind these actions cannot be described as “musical.”
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Imberty (1995) suggests that the first musical productions of
infants involve two key features, namely, pivot and colmatage.
“Pivot” refers to a stable musical element, and “colmatage”
specifies the variable nuances intrinsic to the musical event.
However, both elements may arguably emerge only when an
“attentive shift” has occurred—as we started to discuss in the
section Musical Goals. This involves a shift in focus toward
the sonic goals of the infant’s actions, rather than (or in
addition to) their kinematic and visual dimensions. To be
clear, this does not mean that before the shift occurs infants
are unable to perceive the sounds associated with musical
events. Indeed, we have already discussed their considerable
perceptual aptitude for sound. Rather, before this time, it
appears that they are not able to focus on the sound as
the primary object of their action-as-perception. In other
words, the “attentive shift” permits the constitution of a
first musical context where the infant’s goal is intrinsically
“musical.” We refer to this basic form of musical activity
as teleomusicality (in Greek τέλoζ means essentially “goal”
or “result”). Likewise, we define the basic motor actions
directed toward a musical goal as “teleomusical acts.” Here we
may develop an approximate distinction between original and
constituted teleomusical acts.
Original Teleomusical Acts (OTAs)
These involve patterns of motor behavior that emerge in early
infancy, such as grasping and shaking (e.g., a rattle placed in the
hand). These actions are executed more or less spontaneously,
enabling the basic forms of action-perception looping required
to explore and engage with the sonic environment in which the
infant is embedded. However, it is only by around 6 months of
age that such activities may begin to be understood as properly
teleomusical—it is at this age that infants focus specifically on the
sonic properties of the objects they engage with (as opposed to the
kinematic dimensions that seem to occupy them earlier on), and
to begin to develop controlled actions in order to achieve sonic
goals.
Constituted Teleomusical Acts (CTAs)
These are not “primary” acts: they are built through the
unification of sets of OTAs. Yet they rapidly develop kinematic
fluidity, allowing the infant to execute them as unitary goal-
directed actions. For adults, consider actions like playing a chord
on the piano: this requires temporal coordination, sensibility
of the fingers, wrists, arms, and back, expressivity, and so on.
However, a skilled pianist does not integrate these categories
one by one. Rather, she would achieve the goal (playing this
chord in a certain way) through a fluid, non-reducible (holistic)
execution, where the primary focus remains on the musical
sound being produced, rather than on the kinematics behind
it. For infants, similar behaviors may be witnessed when they
hold a stick to hit another object and play with its sounds:
after they gain some familiarity with the situation they are
involved in, their attention—as with adults—is not focussed
solely on the movement (kinematics), nor on the stick in its
causal relationship with the drum, but mostly on the resulting
sound.
OTAs, CTAs and the Three Conducts
OTAs are basic and simple to perform. They begin as
spontaneous proclivities for movement—they emerge in infancy
seemingly without any imposition or help from the caregiver.
As such, they may be understood as self-organizing behaviors
(more on this shortly). They are also plastic and can be easily
refined and performed in different contexts (through different
strategies and motivations). Indeed, they are ecologically relevant
with regard to how sonic affordances develop in a given subject-
object relationship. Because of this, they also quickly become
goal-directed toward the the properties of the sound and the
enactment of protomusical structures. Every healthy infant
possesses the skills necessary to perform the basic acts of hitting,
plucking, or scratching (see also Godøy, 1997, 2003; Delalande,
2009). Accordingly, musical development in infancy could be
considered as an emerging shift from the basic and spontaneous
acquisition of OTAs to the development of CTAs. It is reasonable
to argue that once a repertoire of CTAs is established, the young
“musician” may then begin integrate other qualities into her
musical life (such as extra-musical values). Indeed, she may
now engage in musical activities that involve more complex
forms of social co-ordination (such as performing together) and
to develop the affordances of sounding objects in new ways
through composition and improvisation. In line with this, we
may now consider the three types of musical “conduct”8 offered
by Delalande (2009), each of which is an extrapolation on the
developmental framework Piaget (1964)9 refers to as “the phases
of the game”:
1) The explorative conduct is based on the discovery of sounds
and noises. It corresponds to the sensorimotor game, which,
according to Piaget (1964) dominates the first 2 years of
life. After 6 months from birth, as we discussed, the infant
begins to explore the auditory possibilities of the surrounding
environment in an increasingly controlled way. At this stage
we suggest that OTAs are being developed into CTAs.
2) The expressive conduct corresponds to the phase Piaget’s
defined as symbolic game, and characterizes the years of
kindergarten. Delalande suggests that during this period
the child begins to attribute extra-musical values to sounds
in association with certain situations, places, social roles,
expectations, and so forth. This enriches the primary form
of sensorimotor understanding with a broader domain of
meaning attribution. This phase, then, may be understood
to further strengthen CTAs into musical actions and
understandings that are more relevant in cultural contexts.
3) The organizational conduct emerges when the child discovers
the enjoyment of applying rules to her own musical games
(this corresponds to Piaget’s game of rules). These rules also
play a crucial role in practices such as musical analysis
and composition, where the agent develops and employs a
particular and/or personal strategy to achieve the desired
goal. In this sense, even using chance as a compositional
8A conduct is defined as a set of coordinated actions, relevant for a specific goal.
9See e.g., Bart, 2004; Gopnik, 2012, for recent research on Piaget’s cognitive stages
more generally.
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methodology is still a choice, a self-imposed rule10. This
phase, thus, may be thought of as moving beyond given
musical cultural norms, enhancing creativity and curiosity to
further understand—and explore—theoretical and analytical
musical possibilities.
Any pedagogical work that aims to develop musical expertise,
Delalande suggest, should focus on these three interactive and
sensorimotor conducts (see also Nicolopoulou, 1993). But how
could a music teacher or a caregiver help the child do that?
Let us focus on the explorative conduct—which, as we argue,
involves the gradual transformation of OTAs into CTAs. Here
the infant comes to understand the relationship between the
physical properties of the explored object and its practical
possibilities for (musical) action. Research by Bondioli (1996)
points to three ways in which such processes may be nurtured in
children. In particular she refers to (i)mirroring, where the adult
reproduces the spontaneous sound-based discoveries of the child;
(ii)modeling, where the adult helps the infant to reach a musical-
directed goal; and (iii) scaffolding, which is based on the active
interaction between the two in order to develop musical ideas
(here readersmay also consider Gal’perin, 1957, 1967, 1969, 1982,
1989a,b,c, 1992; Vygotsky, 1978; Kozulin et al., 2003; Schiavio
and Cummins, 2015).
Another important idea of Delalande concerns the continuous
employment and development of the same exploratory,
expressive, and organizational dynamics throughout one’s
musical life. In other words, earlier modes of engagement and
conduct are not understood to be progressively replaced by those
that emerge later on. Rather, primary modes continue to be
crucial to creative musical engagements. Thus, improvisation
and compositional practices can be seen as continuous with all of
the ontogenetic processes of exploration just described, where the
sounding object explored is the relevant musical instrument(s)
(including the voice), and its harmonic, melodic, and timbral
possibilities, which may then be organized in new ways (Menin
and Schiavio, 2012). Thus, even in older children and adults, the
creative enactment of new patterns and relationships necessarily
involves reengagement with fundamental musical processes,




Thus far we have begun to lay the groundwork for an approach
to musical development that is rooted in exploratory behaviors
andmotor activity more generally. In doing so we have attempted
to show how early musicality may be conceived of as a dynamic
and self-organizing phenomenon—one that cannot be fully
captured in terms of developmental programs acting in response
to environmental stimuli. Instead, we have suggested that the
10The reference here is for John Cage and his well-known use of I-Ching for
composition, during the Fifties.
11Here readers may be interested to consider master improviser Evan Parker’s
thoughts on the importance of the “bio-feedback” between performer and
instrument (see Borgo, 2005).
emergence of musicality in infants is better understood in terms
of ongoing loops of perceptually guided action by which new
affordances for behavior (or “conduct”) emerge and develop.
Importantly, such processes are grounded in a primordial
proclivity for movement and exploration (which result in the
enactment of action understandings facilitated by the neural
mirror mechanisms discussed above).
This view echoes a body of work that conceives of human
development in general as a non-linear and bidirectional process
(see e.g., Gibson, 1958; Thelen and Smith, 1994; Bernstein, 1996),
highlighting the role of “particular experiences as catalysts for
developmental cascades” (Walle, 2016; see also Spencer et al.,
2009). A way to examine how motor development and different
cognitive functions influence each other (see Campos et al.,
2000; Iverson, 2010) might involve the adoption of dynamic
systems theory (DST). Although, a full discussion on DST clearly
exceeds the aims of the present contribution, it is important
to introduce its main features. Very briefly, DST is a branch
of mathematics that studies how complex systems evolve over
time (Beer, 1995). From the molecular to the cultural level,
development is examined in terms of the multiple interactions
of constantly evolving sub-systems that unfold over timescales
from milliseconds to years (see Kelso, 1995). Producing sounds,
for example, involves coordination of limbs, activation of
muscles, and, in some cases, the perception of the auditory
feedback. All parts must work together to produce a successful
action and its related sound. A DST perspective, thus, does
not try to understand musical behaviors (in this case, sound-
producing actions) by analysing each part separately. Rather,
it investigates how the subsystems influence each other over
time to produce a meaningful pattern that results in successful
(teleomusical) actions. Such processes can be expressed via
differential equations,12 allowing the researcher to consider the
sub-systems involved as continuous and mutually interacting,
rather than as discreet. Musical development, therefore, does
not “depend” solely on brain maturation, nor only on the
ability to master a certain perceptual or motor ability. Rather,
as critical changes in each sub-system might cause a shift
in the whole network, it depends on how the entire system
coordinates successfully to achieve a particular (musical) goal.
In line with our comments above, it should also be noted that
while many approaches to early musical development rightly
stress the importance of the infant’s relationship with primary
caregivers, our view attempts to give equal weight to the (more-
or-less) independent exploratory activities of the infant. As we
12These are mathematical equations that relate certain functions with their
derivatives. Generally speaking, “functions” describe physical qualities, while
“derivatives” express their rates of change. Non-linear differential equations—
the ones used by DST researchers—are adopted to describe how the complex
functions of dynamically interacting systems unfold diachronically. In such cases,
each equation (i.e., system) contains the other within it as a variable, so a change
in the state of one will necessarily entail a change in the other. Because the
functions of such systems influence each other recursively, their derivatives cannot
be expressed as directly proportional to input as they can with simpler linear
systems. Accordingly, such systems (e.g., organism and environment) are said to
be coupled non-linearly. As such, they cannot be understood as separate domains,
but rather as aspects of “one nondecomposable system” that evolves over time
(Chemero, 2009, p. 26).
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have anticipated, this may help to make a clearer distinction
between actions and relationships that are explicitly musical
and those that might best be referred to as “protomusical.”
While repertoires of shared gestures and sounds enacted by
infants and caregivers to communicate emotional states and
bodily needs do involve parameters that are employed in musical
dynamics (intensity, duration, rhythm, timbre, pitch, phrasing,
and so forth), we should be careful not to simply assume that
all of this is indicative of an innate musicality (see Trevarthen,
1997, 1999, 2001). Indeed, it may be argued that we can
only define such behaviors as musical a-posteriori: from the
immediate perspective of the infant, they arguably lack any direct
relationship with “music” as such. As we just suggested, they
are likely to be more indicative of non-musical goals (e.g., those
related to nutrition and well-being more generally). In other
words, although the earliest caregiver-infant interactions involve
intersubjective motor behaviors that engage many music-like
components, we suggest that the realization of musicality proper
should reflect activity that is directed toward more distinctly
musical goals. To be clear, this distinction need not undermine
claims that the social and emotional aspects of our musicality
can be traced in large part to such primordial infant-caregiver
interactions—it is not intended to impose a discontinuity. Rather,
it simply seeks to refine our understanding by considering how
an explicitly musical behavior emerges as the infant explores its
environment and begins to focus on the production of sound
itself13.
As we have seen, before the attentive shift, the infant’s
environment contains a number of possibilities for
sound-making, which may be facilitated by, but not wholly
dependent on, the caregiver. The caregiver might place a rattle
in the infant’s hand, for example, or the infant may engage
with the object directly. However, as we also considered, in
the first months the infant’s attention is spread across the
modalities, often with more focus on the kinematic aspects of
the engagement (movement). Importantly, the attentive shift
that occurs after 6 months involves a new, more focussed, kind
of musical activity, which may now be directed toward the sonic
possibilities of the object at hand. This occurs first through the
exploration of the relationship between spontaneous movements
and sound, and then via increasingly controlled goal-directed
manipulations resulting in patterns of behavior (which we refer
to as OTAs). It is here, we suggest, that (teleo)musicality as such
begins (see Figure 1).
Again, this does not mean that caregivers are not involved
in such processes. They (and teachers, and peers) will play
an important role later on in fostering more complex and
cooperative musical activities associated with the development
of CTAs and Delalande’s modes of conduct discussed above.
However, because this perspective gives more attention to the
exploratory capacities of young infants, it may offer a more
nuanced approach than frameworks that focus mostly on infant-
caregiver interactions. In brief, we suggest that the behavior that
13These processes develop in conjunction with the (extra-musical) emotional and
social experiences in order to imbue music with its broad meaning for human life.
This of course is relevant to the expressive mode of conduct discussed by Delalande.
occurs before the attentive shift (before 6 months of age and the
emergence of OTAs) is best referred to as protomusical because
it may be directed only inferentially to a musically relevant goal
(see also Miller, 2000; Fitch, 2005; Figure 1).
The ideas of protomusicality (which may be seen in the
interaction with caregivers) and teleomusicality (which involves
the development of OTAs and CTAs) may help explain the
different ontogenetic trajectories by which basic musical skills
emerge in infancy—e.g., the ability to synchronize with music,
manipulate sound making objects toward musical goals, be
sensitive to and participate in the different nuances of musical
events, and to understand the musical actions of others. Likewise,
this framework may also help us better understand the processes
by which musical agents develop such skills beyond infancy (i.e.,
by constantly implementing and improving their repertoire of
CTAs in new, creative ways). It could also be argued that an
infant who does not transform OTAs in CTAs (perhaps because
her musical environment is not affordative enough, or simply
because her attention is captured more by the visual nuances of
an object) will still possess the basic music-related actions she
once developed during her exploratory sonic behaviors. Indeed,
the ability to shake a rattle and listen to its sounds, to push the
keys of a piano in various patterns, to move to a rhythm or sound,
or beat a stick against a toy drum all afford the development
of basic forms of rhythmic, melodic, and other sonic patterns.
Likewise, elementary forms of dancing, singing along, humming,
gesturing, and a general sense of “feeling” the music all have roots
in early sensorimotor development and exploratory behaviors.
These are examples of music-like activities that make up a
substrate of goal-directed musical actions that are shared among
all human beings, but that develop in various ways depending on
their history of interactivity with a given milieu. This can help
to explain, for example, why the ability to “move to the beat,” is
so widespread and easy to achieve even by non-musicians—who
may nevertheless possess considerable specialized sensorimotor
knowledge associated with the manifestations of music they
inevitably engage with in their day to day lives as cultural
beings. With this in mind, we now turn to consider the
4E framework mentioned above to offer further support
for the dynamic and self-organizing approach to musical
development we have been advocating for. In doing so, we
will explain how this perspective aligns with our discussion of
teleomusicality.
TELEOMUSICALITY MEETS 4E
COGNITION: A GUIDE TO DISCOVERY
Teleomusicality is a way to interpret the ontogenetic origins
of human musicality as a dynamical, creative, explorative, and
action-based phenomenon. It is rooted in a non-dualistic view
that considers experience and behavior as continuous with
each other, both being emergent properties of the ongoing
interactivity occurring between a living system (brain and body)
and its (social, historical, cultural, and physical) environment.
Teleomusicality thus conceives of “music” as a property of such
interaction, which depends upon the biological complexity of
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FIGURE 1 | This model captures the constitution of teleomusicality through the development of OTAs into CTAs. This occurs thanks to the attentive shift that emerges
through the manual exploration of the environment’s sonic properties. The dotted lines show how, once the attentive shift has occurred, infants may re-engage in
explorations or OTAs before developing new CTAs (adapted from Schiavio, 2014).
the living system (e.g., its capacity to move and meaningfully
explore the world) and its history of structural coupling with its
contingent niche (which provides an adequate motor repertoire).
Our perspective has focussed so far on what allows this property
to emerge in infancy—namely, the attentive shift that infants
display between 6 and 10 months of age. To better support
such claims we now frame our view within the 4E approach
to cognition we began to consider early on. In doing so
we will explore different theoretical accounts that point to a
new understanding of human cognition (seen as Embodied,
Embedded, Enacted, and Extended). Before examining in more
detail what each instantiation of these “Es” entails, let us
introduce some of the general tenets of the model with a brief
historical excursus.
The last 60 years of research in the science of mind witnessed
a number of paradigm shifts that have kept the field alive and
fascinating. Amajor one began in the late Fifties and early Sixties,
when the rise of so-called “cognitivism” challenged the dominant
behaviorist view (Fodor, 1968). Behaviorism tried to shed light
on the nature of cognition by developing law-like relationships
between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. However, it
“allowed no reference to the internal states of the organism [and]
explanations of behavior had to be formulated in terms of sensory
stimuli and behavioral conditioning” (Thompson, 2007, p. 4;
see also Watson, 1913; Skinner, 1938 for primary sources). The
cognitivist paradigm, by contrast, offered a way to understand the
inner workings of the mind in terms of a device that manipulates
symbols. As such, “it is thus concerned with the formal rules
and processes by which the symbols appropriately represent the
world” (Thelen, 2000, p.4; see also Fodor, 1975, 1983 for primary
sources). The recently emerged 4E approach to mind offers a
radically different perspective. It holds that mental activity is not
realized by symbolic manipulation (or information-processing)
in the head. Rather, it consists of patterns of perception and
action that are continuously implemented by the entire organism
(brain and body), in a constant interplay with the world. Let us
now consider the implications of this orientation in more detail,
with a special focus on musical development.
Embodiment is the idea that the entire body of the living
system participates in driving cognitive processes. This involves
the continuous integration of sensorimotor activity (action-
as-perception). The circularity between sounds and actions
described in the first sections of the paper captures this idea
within the domain of musical development. As we considered,
developing music-related motor skills is not a property inherent
to our brain alone (e.g., in terms of information stored in the
head). Rather, it emerges only in relation to a given operative
network. This is constituted by (i) adequate environmental
supports for musical activities to take place; (ii) the living body,
which adapts to the changing demands of the environment
by enacting sensorimotor loops of action and perception; and
(iii) the brain, which negotiates between internal and external
feedbacks by integrating relevant information (e.g., via themirror
mechanism).
Importantly, the interactions between body, brain, and world
strongly constrain the possibilities of the living system to act
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and cognize. Therefore, in addition to being embodied, the
mind is also Embedded—it cannot be fully understood without
considering how the social, physical, and cultural environment,
co-constitutes one’s mental life. Consider here the issue of
perceptual learning, as discussed by Clarke (2005) in the context
of ecological psychology. While more traditional approaches
advocate for a notion of perceptual and cognitive development
in terms of collection of environmental information—and
the acquisition of increased “coding power” to process such
information—an ecological view offers a radically different
perspective (Schiavio, 2016). By this light, perception is not
primarily for the accumulation of information. Rather, as we
discussed above, it is for the guidance of action. In brief,
this approach embraces the “profoundly active” ways living
organisms shape relevant skills in relation to the environments
they inhabit—a process that may occur without any “explicit
training involved”:
[o]n first encountering a xylophone, the child’s more-or-less
unregulated experiments with hands or sticks will result in all
kinds of accidental sounds. With unsupervised investigation,
the child may discover that different kind of actions [...]
give rise to differentiated results [...], and even that these
distinctions can themselves be used to achieve other goals
(Clarke, 2005, p. 23).
This resonates with the central point of the Enactive
understanding of mind. As McGann (2014) notes, the enactive
psychology is surprisingly similar with John Dewey’s positions.
Dewey (1896) argues against a static stimulus-response structure
governing behavior, because a “stimulus” always involves a
perceptual encounter that cannot be abstracted from the active
and contingent behavioral states of the agent. Similarly, from
the enactive perspective perception and cognition are seen as
relational properties that emerge from the constant interplay
between organisms and the worlds they participate in shaping
(Varela et al., 1991). Doing music, or learning music, are two
examples of possible interactivities. Music, as we mentioned
in the section From Action to Musical Experience, might be
conceived of as a form of embodied action humans adopt
to make sense of certain properties of the environment that
are discovered in early infancy. But if engaging in musical
activities is best understood as the enactment of certain “points
of view,” or dispositions that an agent adopts to interact with
its contingent niche (including other agents), then we may
conclude that (e.g., musical) “[d]evelopment, and therefore
learning, is essentially an endogenously self-generating process;
it is therefore unnecessary—and impossible—to ‘instruct’ it
from the outside. This runs directly counter to the widespread
notion that ‘learning’ is a process of ‘instruction,’ involving a
process of information transfer from teacher to pupil” (Stewart
et al., 2010, p. 9; see also Schiavio and Timmers, 2016; van der
Schyff et al., 2016). In other words, our Elysa enacts her own
world of meaning by engaging with music-like activities without
being instructed to do this. It is her biological complexity,
her developing physical possibilities and proclivities, her
history of coupling with the surrounding (physical, social, and
cultural) environment that affords possibilities, and informs her
understanding of sounds, actions, interactions, and play in an
ongoing way (Schiavio et al., 2016).
Finally, we could also argue that teleomusicality is an Extended
phenomenon because it emerges in relation with devices and
environments that co-constitute music-like behaviors (and not
only “afford” them). Consider here the classic example from
Vygotskij (reported in Borgo, 2007), where he describes how
children cannot tell what they are drawing before they end
their activity. In a sense, the pen and the paper shape their
cognitive intuition and creativity, driving their ability to draw and
elaborate conceptually on what they are engaged in. It should be
noted here that such idea is not the same as the one endorsed
by scholars working within classic ecological frameworks (see
Gibson, 1977). The central point of the “extended mind thesis”
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998) is that non-biological devices, if
successfully coupled with a cognitive system, could become
part of the organism’s mental machinery. In a musical domain,
this may resonate with the idea that the meanings enacted in
early musical explorations are distributed across objects (and
other agents) beyond the individual. Elysa’s musical engagement
with the toy rattle is not fully realized in the head, nor is it
only occurring because of her ability to “pick up” information
from the environment and “tune herself ” to it (as in classical
ecological frameworks). In a sense, rather, the mental processes
that participate in Elysa’s musical behaviors “extend” beyond her
skin, allowing the (possible) success of her teleomusicality (i.e.,
non-violation of expected musical goals). Music-making, from
this perspective thus becomes a pole of action and perception
that extends across multiple domains, and includes surfaces,
toys, sticks, and many other valuable tools (and interacting
participants), which constantly inspire and drive the desire to
further explore the environment and make sounds meaningfully.
This has strong implications for early music pedagogy, and
for research investigating the development of perception and
cognition in infancy more generally.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced the notion of teleomusicality to
highlight the active, self-organizing, embodied, goal-directed,
and creative nature of musical development. We believe this
concept may offer greater explanatory power when compared to
more traditional understandings of what the early development
of human musicality entails. We started our discussion with a
detailed description of the mutuality of perception and action
from a developmental perspective. In line with current trends
in developmental cognitive neuroscience we argued for the
fundamental importance active experience has for shaping the
(musical) mind. In particular, we aimed to emphasize how
embodied actions play a fundamental role in allowing a living
system to interact with its social and physical environment
in successful ways. One of the emergent properties of such
interactions, as we discussed in the following section, is a
particular kind of behavior that we can associate with what we
consider “music.” Indeed, through the manual explorations of
the environment that characterize the infant’s first months of
life, a number of “sonic discoveries” are made that stimulate
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the infant to further engage in activities that are explicitly
directed toward sound-making. Such sonic possibilities are
afforded by the environment via self-organized trajectories of
goal-directed activities that become reinforced and richer over
time should the infant choose to engage with them. We labeled
these as teleomusical acts. We then individuated two sets of
musically relevant actions: original teleomusical acts (OTA) and
constituted teleomusical acts (CTA). While OTAs can be easily
witnessed in infants’ early exploratory behaviors, CTAs reflect the
development and mastery of the specific goal-directed chains of
action.
When an infant explores the environment and her attention
is captured by the sound properties of an object, she might
employ a specific goal-directed motor behavior to generate (and
to modify) sounds. She can, for example, continuously hit an
object in order to play with the sounds and even generate basic
rhythmic, dynamic, or melodic variations. When this kind of
activity exhibits clear goal-directedness (that is, when the infant
is employing specific actions in order to generate and play with
sounds), then the actions used by the infant can be named
original teleomusical acts. As the infant grows older and the
ability to master these actions improves, she could perform more
sophisticated patterns of goal-directed sensorimotor activity,
perhaps associating different OTAs without compromising the
fluidity of her movements. This is evident in adult musicians,
who can easily display non-associative motor behaviors while
playing. When, for example, a professional guitarist explores the
dynamic possibilities of the instrument to increase the tension
of a given theme, she will not focus on the position of each
finger independently. Her motor expertise, rather, allows her
to intervene and modify the piece’s dynamics through a series
of coordinated movements, without unnecessary propositional
thoughts. Similarly, as an infant acquires more motor expertise,
she develops greater ability to reach particular musical goals with
sound-making objects without focusing on single movements.
Although at the beginning she might encounter difficulties and
therefore focus on single actions (e.g., holding a drumstick
securely, exploring the areas on the striking surface to generate
different sounds), after some time she will be able to construe
and perform basic sets of actions with greater accuracy and
fluidity, individuating and realizing specificallymusical goals (the
goal of the set of action is “playing with sounds” rather than
“playing with the stick”). Both OTAs and CTAs, therefore, are
constituent of human musical development as they shape the
degree of meaning attribution in an ongoing way (affordance,
skill, creative-expressive possibilities, understanding the musical
actions of others). And, as we have been considering all along,
this all reflects the circular interplay between perception and
action that is central to current research in neuroscience and
development among others.
Moreover, we also associated such ideas with the three modes
of “conduct,” proposed by Delalande. We suggested that the
explorative conduct describes the development of OTAs into
CTAs, while the expressive conduct reflects the early attribution
of meanings to music activities—which may involve extra-
musical and cultural values. We finally briefly mentioned the
organizational conduct—where the child starts applying rules
to his or her own musical game, enhancing creativity, and
finding new possibilities for further interactions (which might
be developed later on in analytical and compositional skills). The
notion of teleomusicality was also discussed within the context of
the 4E approach to cognition. Here we noted how the 4E model
is well suited to capture the main aspects of teleomusicality,
displaying potential to be further implemented as a framework in
educational settings (see van der Schyff, 2015). In particular, we
emphasized how an understanding of the ontogenetic emergence
of musicality in terms of explorations and active sensorimotor
loops may help us decenter the traditional focus on brain and
cognitive processes, toward a more dynamical framework, where
meaning-making involves the entire body of the agent in its active
coupling with the world (see Schiavio and van der Schyff, 2016).
To further clarify the connection between the 4E approach
and the notion of teleomusicality, consider the three components
that need to be into place for teleomusicality to occur, specifically,
(i) the skills to perform and understand (e.g., via mirror neurons)
goal-directed actions, (ii) the motivation to engage in sound-
oriented activities, and (iii) the ability to identify and interact
with musically-relevant affordative structures in the social and/or
physical environment, where the motivated behavioral patterns
directed toward sounds could be enacted upon. These categories
reflect three of the main central points of the 4E approach to
cognition, namely the importance of the bodily power of action,
(Embodiment), the self-organizing properties of the living system,
who brings forth a personal point of view to meaningfully engage
in motivated activities in light of the shifting demands of the
environment (Enaction), and the structural features of an agent’s
milieu, which directly affects his or her intrinsic motivations
and behaviors (Embedment), allowing some cognitive tasks to
be offloaded in certain tools and devices of the agent’s niche
(Externalism). It should be noted that also in the protomusical
phase, infants could explore the sound properties of the
environment. We have argued, however, that this might reflect
a differently motivated engagement with such activities. This
does not mean that protomusical behaviors do not play a role
in the flourishing of one’s musical skills. In fact, mother-infant
interactive behaviors do help infants develop perceptual and
motor capacities that will certainly affect the organism’s musical
trajectories. However, we maintain that it might more helpful
(in terms of clarity) to identify musicality proper with the
intrinsically motivated sound-making activities that characterize
the (sometimes unsupervised) exploratory behaviors infants
engage with in their everyday life. Such activities will also have an
important impact on the young organism’s motor and perceptual
development, and are thus internalized by the infant. The studies
on mirror neurons we reviewed support this last comment by
showing that goal-directed actions are mirrored when these
are present in one’s motor repertoire—so that before actually
engaging with musically-relevant actions, infants may not posses
the motor knowledge required to specifically focus on “music.”
As we suggested above, this ability develops in a bidirectional way
with the infants’ drive to explore their environment manually.
The more they explore the environment, the more they discover
sound-related properties inherent to it and the actions required
to produce and manipulate such properties in various ways. And
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as they gain such sensorimotor knowledge, they may also further
explore their environment. We expect that future studies on the
development of musical expertise will thus consider in greater
detail the self-organizing and embodied properties inherent to
such coupling, without positing too strict dichotomies between
neural, behavioral, and ecological levels.
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